We attempt in this article to contribute to the development of empirical methods for measuring the impacts of place-based local development strategies. Previous approaches typically founder against the challenge of estimating the counterfactual of how the outcome indicator of interest would have performed in the impact neighborhood in the absence of the intervention. We introduce a method, labeled an Adjusted Interrupted Time Series, which advances the precision of this counterfactual and offers a stronger basis for drawing causal inferences. In particular, it avoids the neighborhood selection bias by using the idiosyncratic, pre-intervention level and slope of the indicator in the impact neighborhood as the basis for estimating the counterfactual in the postintervention period.
Interrupted Time Series, which advances the precision of this counterfactual and offers a stronger basis for drawing causal inferences. In particular, it avoids the neighborhood selection bias by using the idiosyncratic, pre-intervention level and slope of the indicator in the impact neighborhood as the basis for estimating the counterfactual in the postintervention period.
We applied the AITS approach in three case studies of large-scale community development initiatives using single-family home prices as the outcome indicator. We found the method capable of measuring impacts that manifested themselves either as a change in the base level of prices or in the rate of price appreciation, an important distinction that prior approaches typically blur. We also found, however, a situation in which the method appears unreliable. The AITS method benefits from more recurrent data on outcomes during the pre-and post-intervention periods, and an inter-temporal pattern in such data that avoids great volatility. We conclude that the AITS approach to measuring effects of community development initiatives holds strong promise, with caveats.
impacts of community development initiatives. Its strength is in dealing with the comingled problems that have plagued the ability to draw causal inferences from prior methods, establishing a convincing counterfactual and dealing with neighborhood selection bias, as we shall explain below. Essentially, the AITS method makes pre-and post-intervention comparisons of both the level and slope (collectively what we call "trend" hereafter) in the target neighborhood outcome indicator of interest. The postintervention measurements are adjusted, however, for extra-target neighborhood factors that affect the outcome indicator in all of the city's low-income neighborhoods, including those that were not targeted for the intervention. Thus, the method makes both pre-/post-comparisons within the intervention neighborhood after taking into account factors that affect the measured outcome in all low-income neighborhoods, and so does a much better job in isolating the effect of the targeted intervention on conditions in the impact areas. As such, we believe it can, under certain circumstances, offer a powerful tool to the program impact evaluator and policy analyst in the realm of community development.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We begin by examining the challenges that establishing a counterfactual and neighborhood selection present to the program impact evaluator, in the context of reviewing previous approaches to community development impact evaluation. We then present our AITS method, first in a non-technical, graphic form and then as an econometric model, explaining how it meets the challenges above.
Next, to demonstrate the method we apply it to measuring home price impacts in three illustrative cases of large-scale, place-based community development initiatives. Finally, we assess the strengths and limitations of the AITS method in this application, and implications of our work.
The Challenge of Measuring Impacts of Community Development Initiatives
There are numerous challenges in trying to measure precisely the effects of placebased revitalization initiatives, which have been well-documented (Bartik, 1992; Baum, 2001; Bloom & Glispie, 1999; Erickson & Friedman, 1989; Fulbright-Anderson, Kubisch, & Connell, 1998; James, 1991; Mueller, 1995; Rossi, 1999; Taub, 1990; Weiss, 1972 Weiss, , 1998 . 2 These include:
-the intervention may not be discrete and/or may occur in multiple phases, rendering it difficult to delineate precisely pre-and post-intervention periods -effects may transpire only after a significant lag -effects may be difficult to measure, especially if they involve changes in attitudes and expectations -the most appropriate indicator(s) of effect(s) may not be obvious, or might vary by neighborhood context -effects may be produced by synergistic relationships, making attributions to individual causes difficult -effects may emanate over space to an extent that does not closely correspond to the boundaries established for the neighborhood under investigation -effects may emanate over space to such a wide extent that "control neighborhoods"
are inadvertently affected by a distant intervention -people who may accrue the most benefits in target neighborhoods may be most likely to leave the environs, making it difficult to measure full program benefits 2 In this paper we do not address the use of qualitative methods to assess impacts; see Sullivan (1990) .
Here, however, we focus on two interrelated problems that relate to what causal inferences can be drawn from whatever is measured. That is, even if all the above problems were absent, inferences about whether a particular intervention caused any demonstrable difference would be challenged by: establishing the counterfactual and neighborhood selection bias.
Arguably, the most fundamental challenge in drawing causal inferences about a community development initiative's neighborhood impact is establishing the "counterfactual situation:" the patterns of an outcome indicator that would have happened in the neighborhood "but for" the intervention. The counterfactual must be accurately estimated because it provides the baseline of comparison against which the actual changes in the neighborhood's indicators get measured to assess the intervention's putative impact. As we shall see below, different designs approach the estimation of counterfactual in quite different ways with, we will argue, differing degrees of credibility.
Establishing the counterfactual is complicated by the closely related issue of neighborhood selection bias (Rossi, 1999) . That is, the neighborhoods in which community development interventions occur are likely not a random sample of all urban neighborhoods, or even all distressed core community neighborhoods. Some may be targeted for intervention because they have certain strengths that bode well for future development potential, such as proximity to strong neighborhoods, natural amenities or vibrant anchor institutions; such was the selection rationale of the Empowerment Zone program, for example. Yet others may be targeted because they are in especially desperate circumstances of need. Still others undertake major community development initiatives because they have exceptionally able or politically well-connected communitybased organizations there. The upshot is that methods for establishing counterfactuals must take into account the likelihood that what would have transpired in the absence of an intervention in areas targeted for programmatic impacts is not representative, and thus not well-approximated by patterns in other, "generic" low-income neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, conventional methods of dealing with selection bias are inapplicable here. The usual solution either involves random assignment or a two-stage econometric model of the selection process using instruments that affect selection but not subsequent outcomes. In the case of place-based interventions, random assignment is infeasible and the modeling approach is thwarted by either small samples of intervention sites and/or a Byzantine selection process that is difficult to instrument.
What has been tried in the area of community development impacts, as we shall see in the next section, deals with the issue in an unconvincing fashion.
Alternative Methods of Establishing the Counterfactual for Community

Development Interventions
Though many different labels have been applied to different research designs in the past (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002) , we find it helpful to categorize approaches according to three criteria:
-Do they compare indicator values both pre-intervention and post-intervention?
-Do they use time series measurements of the indicator (in either period)?
-Do they observe absolute changes in the target neighborhood only, or make comparisons relative to other, comparison ("control") neighborhoods?
Below we briefly describe various approaches involving permutations of these criteria, provide examples from the community development literature, and point out weaknesses in establishing the counterfactual. We argue that the AITS method, by estimating pre-and post-intervention slopes and levels of indicators in the target neighborhood and then comparing them with those in a control set of neighborhoods, offers a preferable specification of the counterfactual. To aid the reader, Table 1 summarizes the primary differences among the approaches and cites illustrative examples.
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Post-Intervention, Absolute Change Approach
This approach examines changes in an indicator transpiring in a neighborhood after some major event has occurred; direction of change is attributed to the event (Rossi, 1999) . The counterfactual implicit here is that the observed change would not have occurred without the given event(s). Observations of the positive trajectories of low-income neighborhoods making reputed "comebacks" in the 1990s (typically with the help of CDCs) are representative of this approach (Blank, 2000; Grogan & Proscio, 2000; Morley, 1998; Proscio, 2002; Walsh, 1997) .
Post-Intervention, Relative Change Approach
In this case, the change (or slope) in an indicator observed in the target neighborhood during the period during which an intervention is reputedly having an impact is compared to analogous changes in one or more control neighborhoods. In this approach, sometimes called "site matching," the counterfactual is estimated by events in the control neighborhoods. Thus, only the relative advantages of the target over the control neighborhoods after the intervention are taken as evidence of impact. 4 For examples, see Weiss (1972) , Vidal et al. (1986 ), Taub (1988 , Mueller (1995) , Taylor (2002) , Zielenbach (2003), and Smith (2003) .
Pre-/Post-Intervention, Absolute Change Approach
Here, the analyst contrasts measurements of an indicator in the target neighborhood both before and after the intervention; the pre-intervention value (either level or rate of change in the indicator) is assumed to be the counterfactual (Weiss, 1972) . The measurement can be based on as little as one observation each pre-and post-intervention, or many observations at short intervals pre-and post-intervention, permitting an interrupted time series analysis (Rossi, 1999) . Contrast the approaches of Taub (1990) and Bloom (2003) , which use few observations, with that of Bloom and Ladd (1982) , which uses many.
Pre-/Post-Intervention, Relative Change Approach
Recently an approach has been employed that merges the prior two: pre-/postintervention change (either level or rate) in an indicator in the target neighborhood(s) is compared to the analogous change in control neighborhood(s) before and after the intervention. In this approach the counterfactual is the change in control neighborhood(s) before and after the intervention; only inasmuch as the change in the target neighborhood differs from that in the controls will an impact be registered. There are three versions of this approach in the literature, distinguished by the frequency of observations made pre-and post-intervention (Bloom & Glispie, 1999) . Some evaluations use only one observation in each period, thus in effect comparing pre-/post-intervention differences in levels of an indicator between intervention and nonintervention sites. Others use trends established with only two observations pre-and post-intervention, such as Engberg and Greenbaum (1999; 2000) and Greenbaum and Engberg (2000) . Bloom and Glispie (1999) offer another with frequently recurring observations that permit a richer, comparative interrupted time series analysis.
Our Approach: An Adjusted Interrupted Time Series Method
Our approach builds upon the logic of the pre-/post-intervention, relative change approach, but adds one important enhancement: not only the slope but also the level of the outcome indicator is compared inter-temporally and cross-sectionally. As explained in the next subsection, this seemingly minor modification offers significant advantages for reducing the ambiguity of the counterfactual. Our AITS method estimates the counterfactual in two steps. First, we extrapolate from the level and slope of our indicator (estimated from frequently, sometimes simultaneously recurring data on home sales) in the area affected by the intervention into the period after the intervention.
Second, we adjust this extrapolation for post-intervention changes in indicator levels and slopes in all other low-income neighborhoods, to control for forces not associated with the intervention that may be having larger scale effects in other neighborhoods with similar socioeconomic conditions.
To illustrate, suppose that in the city under investigation we observe that our outcome indicator, home prices in this case, is rising at one percent annually in the area that we know from hindsight will be the target of a future community development intervention. By comparison, comparable homes in other low-income neighborhoods in the city are selling from a base that (at some baseline date) is ten percentage points higher and are rising at two percent annually. In the years following the intervention under investigation, suppose that prices in the impact area (controlling for any differences in homes sold) jump immediately to a base that is five percentage-points higher than originally in the impact area and then rise six percent annually on average, whereas those of comparable homes in other low-income neighborhoods rise three percent annually. Now, our counterfactual in the impact area would start by extrapolating the one-percent growth from a low base level into the post-intervention period. But, recognizing that prices in other low-income neighborhoods rose one percentage point faster during this period than they had previously (for reasons with which we need not concern ourselves), this should also apply to our impact area. So, our counterfactual is a two percent annual growth in prices in our impact area that would be predicted in the absence of intervention. Because the actual growth in the impact area was six percent annually, we attribute to the intervention the four percentage-point difference in appreciation rates. Of course, the shifting up the post-intervention level of prices by five percentage points immediately after the intervention also is included as an additional effect.
Thus, our AITS approach can be thought of as equivalent to a "difference-indifferences" model. 5 In the pre-intervention period, the difference between target and control neighborhood indicators was minus ten percentage points in level and minus one percentage point in appreciation rate; after the intervention, the differences change to minus five percentage points in level and plus three percentage points in appreciation rate. Since the difference in the differences changed to favor relatively the impact area in both level and appreciation of the indicator, this hypothetical demonstrates a positive effect of the intervention.
The Comparative Advantages of the AITS Approach
We can demonstrate with the help of some hypothetical graphic illustrations the comparative advantages of the AITS approach over other methods for establishing the counterfactual in community development impact evaluations. Consider first Figure 1 . It portrays hypothetical values over time for some desirable outcome indicator of interest in two sorts of geographic areas in the city under investigation. One is the "control area"
consisting of low-income neighborhoods where no major community development initiatives are targeted during the period. 6 The other is the "target area" where the initiative under study will commence at a time denoted by the vertical, dashed line.
Assume that control area trends in the indicator are as shown by C-C'-C''; the trend break implies that some new forces affecting all low-income neighborhoods in the city began impinging at the time corresponding to the break. Also assume that the area targeted for the initiative starts with a lower level of the indicator (A vs. C) than control areas, but changes at the same rate (i.e., A-A' parallels C-C'). This indicates that the impact area, even before the intervention, had time-invariant indicator values that were well below the control area (indicating, perhaps, a local disamenity), even though the rate of change over time before the intervention was the same in both the intervention and control areas.
[ Figure 1 about here]
We have argued that the preferred specification of the counterfactual in the target area is line A'-A'': the projection of the pre-intervention slope in the target area, adjusted for control area changes in slopes (i.e., the break between C-C' and C'-C'') coincident with the pre-and post-intervention periods. Put differently, the correct test of whether the community development initiative has an effect is whether there is a pre-/postdevelopment break in the slope (and/or shift in level) in the impact neighborhood indicator, which is different than what was observed in the control areas. In effect, A'-A" is the counterfactual for the impact area; it assumes that the rate of change in the indicator for the impact area would be identical as the rate of change in the control area, albeit on a lower base, created by the local disamenity.
Thus, were we to estimate empirically line A-A'-A'', this would signify no impact, because the indicator slope break after the initiative mirrored the slope break observed in control neighborhoods (line C-C'-C''). However, if the indicator in the impact neighborhood after the initiative were to shift up to a higher level (e.g.,
and/or increase more rapidly than the control area slopes (A-A'-D'''), this would signify a positive impact. Conversely, if the indicator in the impact neighborhood after the initiative were to shift down to a lower level (A-A'-B'-B'') and/or increase less rapidly (decrease more rapidly) than the control area slopes (A-A'-B), this would signify a negative impact. These arguments are summarized in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 Assume for simplicity that during the period in question there is no change in the indicator in control areas (line C-C'-C''). But suppose that we also observe points P and P' and thereby deduce no change between pre-and post-intervention periods in the average level of the indicator in the impact neighborhood. Now only if the true, underlying slope in the impact neighborhood were A-A'-A'' would this method's deduction of no impact be correct. As illustrated in Figure 2 , such an observation of points P and P' might well be consistent with quite different types of pre-and postintervention slope breaks, suggesting either strong positive (line B-B'-B'') or negative
[ Figure 2 about here]
If, on the other hand, data were sufficient for estimating slopes pre-and postintervention, the pre-/post-intervention, relative change approach produces the correct counterfactual but a potentially biased empirical measure of impact. The problem arises through using an econometric specification permitting only a pre-/post-intervention change in the slope, excluding a potential shift in the intercept at the intervention time.
Referring to Figure 1 , suppose the true values of the indicator are shown by segments indicator, but no greater rate of change in the impact neighborhood as in control areas.
A specification that forces a spline-like break in the estimated line at point A' would produce, however, a segment like A'-D''', which clearly overstates the rate of increase in the indicator and, hence, the positive impact measured. In sum, the AITS method avoids the potential shortcomings of the pre-/post-intervention, relative change approach by estimating slopes and levels of the indicator in both the target and control areas both before and after the intervention, adjusting the former as appropriate for changes in the latter to establish the counterfactual.
The AITS Model in Econometric Terms
The Basic Model
Our basic AITS regression specification may be expressed symbolically as:
Where the variables are defined as follows: Vector of spatial autocorrelation and heterogeneity correction variables (Can, 1997; Can & Megbolugbe, 1997) ; see below ε A random error term with statistical properties discussed below.
All lower case letters in the equation (b, c, d, etc.) represent coefficients to be estimated.
The subscript "t" denotes a time period for which the indicator is measured; for AITS this typically is monthly or quarterly; here it is whenever a home sells.
The AITS model deals with the neighborhood selection bias challenge by permitting both the level and slope of the indicator in the impact area to differ from that of the generic low-income neighborhood prior to any intervention. Statistical significance of the d coefficient is equivalent to testing for a difference in pre-intervention levels of the indicator in the impact and control neighborhoods, or the difference between C and A in Figure 1 ; statistical significance of the f coefficient is equivalent to testing for a difference in pre-intervention slopes of the indicator in the impact and control neighborhoods, or the difference between the slopes of lines C-C' and A-A' in Figure 1 . Because these potentially idiosyncratic, pre-intervention impact area levels and slopes are modeled explicitly as a basis for estimating a post-intervention counterfactual, the selection bias challenge is overcome. 7 Note that our approach is different from Schill, et al. (2002) , which uses a fixed effects model that has separate dummy variables for each time period within a census tract in order to control for neighborhood conditions in pre and post time periods. We believe that our specification, by allowing for a measured change in both the level and trend in an intervention area provides for more substantive results. Namely, our specification provides program evaluators with evidence that a targeted intervention resulted in either a one-time change in neighborhood conditions,
The test for statistical significance of the coefficient e of the DPOSTIMP variable is equivalent to testing that there is a discontinuous, time-invariant change in the indicator levels in the impact neighborhood after the intervention, as would be the case if there was a shift in the impact area from A' to C' as shown in Figure 1 . We stress that the results of any regression model do not offer conclusive proof of causation, merely association. Nevertheless, the AITS specification, by clearly comparing pre-and post-announcement of intervention differences in indicator levels and slopes (adjusted for changes in control-area slopes), provides exceptionally convincing evidence in this regard.
Econometric Issues
In this application of measuring community development impacts we analyze large samples of homes sales that occur at widely varied locations across a city and moments across a multi-year period. As such, it becomes a special application of a conventional "hedonic index model," the econometric dimensions of which have been developed over a long period (e.g., Goodman, 1978; Clapp, Pace and Rodriguez, 1998;  which would be manifest by a statistically significant change to the DPOSTIMP variable, or a change in the rate of change (TRPOSTIMP), or both. Can and Megbolugbe (1997) found to be robust. We calculated the spatial lag of the indicator variable we report in this paper (home sales price) and included it in our model as an independent variable.
The spatial lag is a spatially weighted average of all of the observations of the dependent variable within a certain distance from the reference observation. Consistent with the approach of Can and Megbolugbe, we used the inverse of the distance (1/d) as the spatial weight. The formula for the spatial lag is:
where P i is the value of the home sale for which we are calculating the spatial lag, d ij is the distance between sales i and j, and P i is one of the set of all sales within distance D of P j and that occurred within the six months prior to the date of P i . We tested spatial lags with D cutoffs of 2,000, 5,000 and 10,000 feet to examine the possibility that spatial dependence may exist over a larger area.
Because of the large number of house sales in the sites investigated, calculating the spatial lag for this indicator variable is extremely intensive computationally. To see if this was justified, we conducted several preliminary tests of spatial lags estimated for various distances using only sales in a contiguous subset of census tracts. We found that no variant of the spatial lag was statistically significant or substantially improved the goodness of fit (R 2 ) of the preliminary models, and we therefore excluded it from the final models reported here. We stress that this is not necessarily a general conclusion;
rather, we believe that our inclusion of census tract fixed effects essentially performed the function of a spatial lag.
A second econometric issue is spatial heterogeneity, sometimes known as spatial submarket segmentation, which refers to the systematic variation in the behavior of a given process across space. Here, the issue is whether the parameters of equation
[1] are invariant across space or whether they assume different values according to the local socioeconomic, demographic, and/or physical contexts of the various neighborhoods comprising the geographic area under study. If such were the case, the error term ε would be heteroskedastic.
To deal with this issue we employed the "spatial contextual expansion with quadratic trend" specification as suggested by Can (1997) . Higher numerical values of X (Y) signify increasing distance from the center of the city heading west (north). These variables typically proved statistically significant in our specifications, suggesting that our various controls for local fixed effects needed further supplementation from these spatial coordinates. They may be interpreted as broad home price gradients measuring accessibility to jobs, amenities or disamenities affecting wide swaths of cities.
In addition to the aforementioned spatial econometric tests, standard heteroskedasticity tests using the Goldfeld-Quandt and other procedures were conducted (Intriligator, 1978: 156) . Though they proved inconclusive, to be conservative we used the White (1980) covariance matrix to estimate standard errors reported here.
An Application of the AITS Method: Home Price Impacts of Community Development Initiatives
In order to test a prototype of the AITS model we applied it in an impact analysis of neighborhood home price impacts from three, purposively sampled, large-scale community development initiatives, each of which had CDCs as major drivers. These are summarized in Table 3 . This section provides details of our particular modifications of the generic AITS model described in equation [1] above, brief summaries of each initiative, followed by results.
[ Table 3 about here]
Overview of Our Impact Analysis
As part of a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative study of the impacts of CDC-led community reinvestment initiatives, we conducted AITS using sales prices of single-family homes as the indicator. Although home prices are certainly not the only appropriate indicator one might consider, it has been used often inasmuch as numerous factors contributing to the neighborhood's quality of life will be capitalized into property values (Grieson & White, 1989; Palmquist, 1992; Polinsky & Shavell, 1976) . We obtained home sales data from local deed records purchased from Experian, a vendor.
Addresses were geo-coded so sales could be identified with particular neighborhoods.
We obtained sufficient data so that several years' worth of sales both before and after the intervention was represented. 9 Executive Directors of CDCs and other key local informants were consulted to obtain information about the timing, nature, and spatial extent of community development initiatives in the neighborhood of interest, so that impact areas and pre-/post-intervention periods could be established.
In our version of equation [1] , each home sale constituted a unit of observation.
To improve its accuracy as a market-based indicator of neighborhood quality of life, we standardized homes sold by controlling for a large number of their structural characteristics and area-invariant fixed effects in the context of equation [1] . 10 The natural log of home price served as the dependent variable. TRALL was operationalized as a set of year-quarter dummy variables, to permit the richest possible variation in the overall level of home prices in each city. Equation [1] was generalized to test not only for pre-and post-intervention changes but also those associated with an "interim period"
as well, during which key construction projects were underway. 11 We denote these variables using the INT acronym instead of POST. We estimated potential effects over the "impact area," which consisted of the multiple contiguous blocks where the initiative was concentrated and all adjacent blocks; details are provided in maps that follow.
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Belmont Neighborhood, Portland, OR Once a bustling area around a trolley line terminal, by the late 1980s, the Belmont commercial corridor in Southeast Portland had degenerated into a mix of empty buildings, industrial establishments, and a few bars and shops; see the map in Figure 3 .
A large, vacant, and deteriorated dairy building was a significant source of blight and had become a haven for drug dealing, further discouraging active patronage of neighborhood business. But in the early 1990s, spurred by sharply increased demand for 9 Details about the data and model can be obtained from the first author. 10 This model represents a variant of a model that was originally developed to test the neighborhood home price externality impacts of a multiple number of small-scale, subsidized housing developments; see Galster et al. (2000; 1999) Subsequently, the basic approach was enhanced in several valuable ways by Johnson and Bednarz (2002) , Ellen et al. (2001) , Schill et al. (2002) and Schwartz et al. (2002) . 11 These interim periods typically lasted a few years; details are provided below. 12 We also investigated impacts in a secondary impact area defined by a ring of blocks within a quarter mile of the primary impact area. Results for these areas were generally less statistically and economically significant, and their inclusion does not alter or enhance the basic conclusions of our analysis. In the early 1990s, REACH initiated a new approach to community revitalization, which involved creation of targeted redevelopment strategies for specific sub-areas within Southeast Portland. These strategies would be designed and carried out by neighborhood organizations and community leaders, with supporting investments made by REACH. As its second such program, REACH selected a five by twelve-block area centering on the Belmont Street business district. Three years after choosing Belmont, REACH was ready to go to work on residential properties in the area, but by then, housing had become less affordable, and REACH switched to the commercial corridor as its redevelopment priority.
In partnership with the Belmont Business Association, REACH developed a commercial revitalization plan that called for multiple and simultaneous investments by neighborhood businesses. Under the plan, REACH and its community partners made improvements to commercial facades, upgraded signage, coordinated business marketing (including a business directory), improved safety through better lighting and heightened security, and held workshops on business development on such issues as marketing. To help prevent the loss of long-time businesses as improvements pushed rents to unaffordable levels, REACH initiated a program to encourage business owners to take long-term leases, and even purchase property. variable, suggesting that the rate of price appreciation was augmented in the impact area due to the intervention. This is contrary to our finding that only the base level of prices, not their relative appreciation, was affected. This is important, as a positive slope finding implies that price increases continue over time, and so compound. Our findings in Portland, however, suggest that the neighborhood improvements resulted in a one-time boost to property values, representing the capitalized benefits of a more attractive commercial district nearby.
[ Figure [ Figure 6 about here]
Despite deterioration, Five Points had development assets on which to build.
Proximity to downtown and an architecturally attractive, if run-down, older housing stock created circumstances ripe for an upswing in residential markets. The business district, however, remained run down, as did many neighborhood residential properties. Even so, rising housing values and an influx of higher income whites and moderate income Latinos aggravated racial tension, and business owners on Welton Street, thought to be the "only black-owned [commercial] strip in the nation," feared displacement by whiteowned businesses. The redevelopment problem: how to create affordable housing for those at the lower end of the income ladder in ways that remove sources of blight, demonstrate the neighborhood's potential for improvement, and contribute to the revitalization of the community's commercial-retail area?
intervention period is found by summing the coefficients for DINTIMP and DPOSTIMP for area 1 and applying the above formula. Cursory examination of price trends presents an ambiguous picture of impact
here. As Figure 7 shows, median home prices in the impact area increased from $40,000 at the beginning of the intervention in 1989 to nearly $60,000 four years after its completion1996, though they still remained below prices in other low-income neighborhoods in other parts of Denver. Moreover, it is unclear from Figure 7 whether post-intervention price trends in the impact area generally outstripped those in other lowincome neighborhoods. Any implications about impact are further clouded by the relatively inferior performance of prices in the Five Points impact area pre-intervention and during the first two years of construction.
[ Figure 7 about here]
The AITS results, presented in the Appendix and portrayed in Figure 8 , however, show a much clearer picture. After accounting for factors that may have influenced price trends in all Denver low-income neighborhoods and controlling for differences in the homes that sold, Five Points' property values remained 20 percent below those in other low-income neighborhoods until the intervention was completed. 15 This is understandable, inasmuch as many of the construction projects were highly disruptive of retail and vehicular traffic. Subsequently, home prices in the Five Points impact area appreciated in relative terms more than 5 percentage points per quarter more than similar homes selling in other low-income Denver neighborhoods. This strongly supports claims of a positive impact of considerable magnitude.
[ Figure 8 about here] Jamaica Plain, Boston, MA During the late 1980s and early 1990s, parts of Jamaica Plain -most notably
Hyde-Jackson Square -served as a haven for drug dealing and violent crime, and a large concentration of vacant lots attracted undesirable activity; see the maps in Figure   9 . Despite this deterioration, the neighborhood remained attractive to a diverse group of Indeed, a cursory view of price trends portrayed in Figure 10 lends credence to the notion of positive impact. JPNDC impact area median prices fell to a low of $45,000 during 1992, considerably below prices in comparable neighborhoods, before reversing themselves during the last half of the interim period. Thereafter, median home prices in the development area generally appeared to outpace growth in other low-income Boston neighborhoods, such that by 1999 they exceeded them by more than $10,000.
[ Figure 10 about here]
The AITS analysis paints quite a different portrait, however; see Appendix and local opinion, and a cursory view of unadjusted home price trends. We believe that this statistical result was produced spuriously as a consequence of several potential weaknesses in the AITS approach that were manifested in this particular instance. It is to this critical discussion of the vulnerabilities of this approach that we now turn.
[ Figure 11 about here]
Potential Shortcomings of the AITS Method
Though we persist in our claim that the AITS method for evaluating impacts of community development initiatives offers numerous advantages over extant approaches, we would be remiss in not discussing its unique potential shortcomings. Two are key.
For a reliable estimation of the counterfactual, AITS demands: (1) substantial numbers of frequently recurring observations in the impact area pre-and post-intervention, and
(2) a well-behaved trend in the indicator pre-intervention (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002) .
Given that the AITS approach uses the level and slope in the outcome indicator pre-intervention as the basis for estimating the counterfactual post-intervention, the precision of these pre-intervention parameter estimates is crucial. Two observations are mathematically sufficient, but more clearly would improve one's confidence in the estimates. In the case of single-family home sales prices, one requires a larger sample over a longer period to confidently distill secular trends from a distinct seasonality cycle.
In certain types of neighborhoods-those with low rates of property turnover or high rates of multifamily rental housing-the use of AITS with home sales prices is risky, or even infeasible.
But even with sufficient numbers of observations of the outcome indicator preand post-intervention, the AITS method may flounder if the indicator (especially during the pre-intervention period) is volatile. The AITS fits distinct linear functions to the preand post-intervention scatters of observations. If the underlying relationships are more curvilinear or cyclical, however, these linear fits will be both imprecise and arbitrary, depending on the period over which observations are collected.
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Our application of the AITS approach to the Jamaica Plain initiative illustrates the consequences when both of the foregoing shortcomings are manifested. First, the preintervention period in the impact area was characterized by an unusual, curvilinear pattern of home prices (see Figure 10 ). This high volatility, moreover, persisted throughout the post-intervention period. Second, the impact area evinced the lowest rate of single-family home sales of any of our study sites, likely due to the preponderance of multifamily housing in the vicinity. Both factors conspired to render the AITS approach's projection of home prices into the interim and post-intervention periods quite imprecise. As such, we place little confidence in the implication of a negative impact from the Jamaica Plain initiative.
Further, the method benefits from more rather than less housing price data on the pre-and post-intervention periods. Again in Boston, the relatively short period, paucity of single-family home sales, and peculiar price behavior in the pre-intervention period rendered the model's performance suspect; a more extended pre-intervention period might have allowed us to correct for this. Finally, the model relies on information on single-family residential transactions, which may display trends that would be different from those in multi-family residential or commercial markets, especially where the impact area is dominated by these kinds of properties.
Summary and Conclusion
We have attempted in this article to contribute to the development of empirical methods for measuring the impacts of place-based local development strategies.
Previous approaches typically founder against the challenge of estimating the counterfactual of how the outcome indicator of interest would have performed in the impact neighborhood in the absence of the intervention. We introduced a method, labeled an Adjusted Interrupted Time Series, which advances the precision of this counterfactual and offers a stronger basis for drawing causal inferences. In particular, it avoids the neighborhood selection bias by using the pre-intervention level and slope of the indicator in the impact neighborhood as the basis for estimating the counterfactual in the post-intervention period, after adjustment by any changes in the trends in control neighborhoods.
We applied the AITS approach in three case studies of large-scale, CDC-led community development initiatives in Portland, Denver, and Boston, using single-family home prices as the outcome indicator. We found the method capable of measuring impacts that manifested themselves either as a change in the base level of prices or in the rate of price appreciation, an important distinction that prior approaches blur. We also found in the case of Boston, however, a situation in which the method appears unreliable. The AITS method benefits from more recurrent data on outcomes during the pre-and post-intervention periods, and an inter-temporal pattern in such data (especially during the pre-intervention period) that avoids great volatility. In the case of Boston, the paucity of single-family home sales in the impact neighborhood and peculiar price behavior in the pre-intervention period badly eroded the model's performance. Of course, the veracity of all previous approaches will be weakened in cases of limited and or/highly volatile data, so this criticism is hardly unique to AITS.
In conclusion, the AITS approach to measuring effects of community development initiatives holds strong promise, based on our theoretical critique of alternative methods and our prototype experiments. Of course, the method is feasible only when there are frequently recurrent observations of the indicator both pre-and postintervention. Moreover, in contexts of thin, volatile data the method has clear limitations.
Nevertheless, we believe it warrants additional experimentation in a wide range of programmatic applications. See Walsh, 1997; Morley, 1998; Blank, 2000; Grogan and Proscio, 2000. Change in indicator level or slope in target neighborhood after intervention is compared to change in level or slope in control neighborhoods (sometimes called "site-matching).
Counterfactual is change in control neighborhoods after intervention. Assumes that difference between target neighborhood change and change in control neighborhoods is attributable to intervention.
See Weiss, 1972; Vidal et al., 1986; Taub, 1988 Taub, , 1990 Mueller, 1995; Taylor, 2002; Smith, 2003 , Zielenbach, 2003 .
Pre-Post Intervention
Indicator level or slope in target neighborhood after intervention is compared to level or slope in target neighborhood before intervention. Counterfactual is pre-intervention level or slope. Assumes that difference between pre-and post-intervention level or slope is due to the intervention. Weiss, 1972; Rossi, 1999; Bloom and Ladd, 1982; Bloom, 2003 Indicator level or slope in target neighborhood after intervention compared to level or slope in target before intervention and to changes in control neighborhoods before and after intervention.
Counterfactual is change in control neighborhoods before and after intervention. Assumes that "change in the differences" between target and control neighborhoods pre-and postintervention is due to intervention. Engberg and Greenbaum, 1999; Greenbaum and Engberg, 2000; Bloom and Glispie, 1999 . No Impact
A -A' -B
Decrease in slope relative to control area C -C' -C"". Reflects lag of target area slope relative to control area.
A -B' -B"" Decrease in level relative to control area at C'.
Reflects downward shift in indicator value relative to control area.
Negative Impact 
